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A Research Article
published in honor of Eugene A. Hammel
Grandparental Effects on Reproductive Strategizing:




This paper analyzes data from the household registers for two villages in the Nôbi
region of central Japan in the late Edo period (1717-1869) to assess how grandparents
may have affected reproductive strategizing in stem families.  The particulars of the
family system fostered a culturally favored set of reproductive goals, in particular, a
daughter as eldest child, followed by a son (and heir), coupled with gender alternation
in subsequent reproduction and overall gender balance.  This reproductive strategy was
generally followed during the stem phase of the domestic cycle, when one or both
grandparents were present, especially when the family head was in the senior
generation.  By contrast, a son-first strategy was favored when childbearing began in
the conjugal phase of the cycle.  This suggests grandparental influence on the junior
couple’s reproductive decisions in favor of the cultural ideal.  I find that the senior
couple’s decision to marry the heir early or late strongly affects the reproductive
strategies followed by him after marriage.  I show that when a grandmother is present at
the onset of childbearing, especially if she is relatively young, the junior couple ends up
with more offspring on average.  A controlled analysis of infanticiding behavior is
interpreted in terms of conjugal power and coalition formation.  It appears that a
grandmother gets her way only when she and her son gang up on the daughter-in-law,
but such a coalition is likely only when her son dominates the conjugal relationship
(which in turn reflects the grandmother’s success in binding the son tightly to her
emotionally and in delaying his marriage).  Otherwise, the grandmother may be shut out
from reproductive decision-making by the solidary conjugal coalition.
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1. Introduction
This paper asks how the presence of one or both grandparents in premodern Japanese
peasant families might affect reproductive strategizing.  It is easy enough to show that
strategic reproductive behavior is distinctive when grandparents are present, but rather
more difficult to infer the extent to which the senior generation actually participated in
reproductive decisions.
In accordance with family systems theory (Skinner 1997; see also Harrell 1997), I
hold that reproductive goals are shaped by family system norms.  In order to focus
meaningfully on grandparental effects, I must first describe the family system that
obtained in the communities under analysis and outline the dynamics of reproductive
strategizing within families.
2. Stem Family Systems
With respect to the sequence of co-residential arrangements, often referred to as the
family cycle or domestic cycle (Note 1), we may distinguish three broad classes of
family systems: conjugal, stem, and joint.   It is characteristic of conjugal family
systems that family formation is equated with marriage, and family extinction with the
death of the married partners.  Since families do not persist beyond the lives of those
who found them, they are not corporations, and the domestic cycle is a rather simple
transformation of the life courses of its members.  By contrast, in stem and joint family
systems a spouse is brought into the family for at least one of the offspring in each
generation.  It follows directly that in such systems households are potentially corporate
-- that is, they may persist indefinitely irrespective of the life spans of particular
members -- and that at least a portion of the domestic cycle will be characterized by a
family structure comprising two or more conjugal units.  Within the more inclusive
category of potentially corporate family systems, stem family systems are distinctive in
that a spouse is brought in for only one of the offspring in each generation.  Succession
is to the child who was married within the household or to the married couple, and
inheritance, which is unequal, favors the single successor/heir.  In the classic stem
family systems of Western Europe and Japan, impartible inheritance served to maintain
farms/estates intact from one generation to the next.
Another defining feature of classic stem family systems is the alternation between
a conjugal phase and a stem phase in which the junior and senior conjugal units co-
reside.  Let us be clear about our terms.  The three elements of an intact conjugal unit
are, of course, husband/father, wife/mother, and child(ren), and, in our usage, the
analyst counts as a conjugal unit (CU) any co-residing two of these three elements.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
http://www.demographic-research.org 113
Thus, a childless couple, a mother and her children, and a father and his children all
count as CUs.  With this crucial point clarified, the two family structures of concern
here may be defined as follows.  A conjugal family (Note 2) contains one and only one
CU.  A stem family contains two or more CUs, but with no more than one per
generation (Note 3). In stem family systems, bringing in a spouse for the single heir
transforms a conjugal family into a stem family, and the death of both members of the
senior couple transforms a stem family into a conjugal family.  Thus, the normal course
of the domestic cycle entails an alternation between stem and conjugal structures and, at
any point in time, yields both conjugal and stem families on the ground (see Figure 1).
The frequency of stem and conjugal families — or, to rephrase, the relative
duration of the stem and conjugal phases of the domestic cycle — is a simple function
of demographic rates.  A rise in age at marriage delays the transition from the conjugal
to the stem phase of the domestic cycle, and a rise in the mortality of mature adults
accelerates the transition from the stem to the conjugal phase. As Berkner (1972) has
argued with admirable clarity with respect to Europe, under premodern demographic
conditions stem-family systems are unlikely to produce a majority of stem families at
any point in time.  In bad times the proportion stem may be very small indeed; in the
wake of the Tempô Famine (1830s) in Japan, for instance, the proportion of families in
the stem phase fell to one-sixth in one of the Nôbi-region villages we are analyzing.
With respect to gender bias, stem family systems contrast sharply with joint family
systems in that kinship is cognatic or bilateral and unilineal kin groups are normally
absent.  These structural features alone greatly restrict the scope for gender bias in
comparison with joint family systems.  Whether in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, or
Japan, the kinship terminologies associated with stem family systems group together
relatives at the same genealogical distance without regard to patrilaterality or
matrilaterality.  In the absence of patrilineages or matrilineages, the scope of
unilineality is limited to the ongoing corporate family itself.  And, in fact, the gender
bias of any stem family system is expressed with neat consistency in terms of marital
residence and the lineality of the family stem.  If the preferred sex of the single heir is
female, then marital residence is uxorilocal (whereby the groom moves on marriage to
the bride's household) and the family stem is matrilineal.  Systems of this kind obtain in
particular areas of both mainland and insular Southeast Asia.  If the preferred sex of the
single heir is male, then marital residence is virilocal and the family stem is patrilineal.
Such systems were widespread in early modern Western Europe and Tokugawa Japan.
If the normative preference is indifferent as to sex (taking the form, for instance, of
primogeniture or ultimogeniture regardless of gender), then marital residence is
ambilocal and the family stem is ambilineal.  Gender-neutral heirship was the norm in
local areas of Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and Japan (Arrizabalaga 1994; Freeman
1958; Suenari 1972).Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
114 http://www.demographic-research.org





Figure 1:  The Japanese domestic cycle (stylized):  Patrilineal stem family system
Note:  Because husbands are on average about eight years older than their wives and age-specific mortality of seniors is
higher for men than for women, the usual progression from intact stem to conjugal is via GM-only stem, as shown here.
Note that in our analysis this intermediate type is considered a truncated stem family rather than an augmented
conjugal family.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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How might we expect these generic features of stem family systems to impact
reproductive behavior?  In general, parents in stem family systems desire relatively few
surviving children, and the minimal acceptable set is typically three children: the heir
and a spare, plus a third of the opposite sex who will marry another heir in a nearby
family.  Too many non-heirs are a drain on the estate.  The relatively relaxed gender
system entails considerable autonomy for both women and men and the possibility that
either may seek non-domestic employment, so that neither sex is strongly favored over
the other.  The lineality of the stem will, of course, mean that parents are likely to aim
for two offspring of the favored sex – two girls in the case of matrilineal stem systems,
and two boys in the case of patrilineal stem systems, but in general parents prefer
balanced offspring sets.  Given any significant gender division of labor, gender balance
in the family as a whole is more important in stem systems than in joint family systems
because families are small, entailing fewer conjugal units and thus fewer adults at any
point in time on average.  In stem family systems, any given family normally has only
one working adult of each sex as offspring are maturing, which puts a premium on
gender balance and, indeed, gender alternation of offspring. In comparison with joint
family systems, child-care needs are more salient and hence more likely to affect
reproductive decisions.  Let’s turn now to our case study of villagers in premodern
Japan.
3. The Stem Family System of Nôbi Villagers
We present here preliminary findings from a project analyzing family demography in
eight villages situated in a compact and homogeneous area near the castle town of
Ôgaki in central Japan. For each of these villages there survives a long run of annual
household registers that provide detailed, accurate records of both family and
demographic processes (for details see Cornell and Hayami 1986).  This paper is based
on data for only two of the eight villages, Nishijo (Hayami 1980, 1985, 1988) and
Asakusanaka (Smith 1977), situated on adjacent polders in the delta of the three major
rivers that traverse the Nôbi Plain.  This area, one of sparsely populated fens at the
beginning of the Tokugawa era (1600-1868), was reclaimed in the seventeenth century
and, during the eighteenth, transformed through massive water-control projects into
productive paddy fields on which cotton, rapeseed, and other cash crops were also
cultivated.  The database is a reconstructed household-by-household record of life-cycle
events that covers uninterrupted periods of 97 years for Nishijo and 114 years for
Asakusanaka (Note 4). In this analysis of reproductive behavior, the sample consists of
360 couples for whom the span of years from marriage to the end of the childbearing
period is completely covered by the registers.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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The family system of this area was characterized by male primogeniture, so that
parents strongly desired at least one surviving son.  But this concern was muted by the
cultural acceptability of, and widespread recourse to adoption and uxorilocal marriage
when no biological son survived.  Families with more than two surviving sons were
pleased to adopt out one to be the heir in another ie (corporate household).  Bringing in
a son-in-law for the eldest daughter was unexceptional practice, despite a degree of
social stigma experienced by the mukoyôshi or married-in son-in-law.  In formal terms
the sex of the single heir was irrelevant. That is, the rights and duties extended by the
natal family to the family of a son who married out as an adopted husband were the
same as those extended to the family of a daughter who married out as a bride (Brown
1988).
Non-heirs normally left their natal household prior to or shortly after the marriage
of the heir.  Some entered other households as spouses of the heir, and many left the
village unmarried to serve as apprentices or servants in nearby villages and towns or to
migrate to one of the larger cities.  Occasionally the heir’s younger son was permitted to
marry in the village and establish a new corporate household.  Provision for these cadet
or  bunke households was a special feature of the Japanese family system.  A cadet
household was set up with the blessing of the honke  or main household, and its
establishment usually entailed the grant of a small portion of the honke’s land.  The
head of the ie was naturally reluctant to jeopardize its continuity by diverting any
sizable portion of its corporate holdings.  Thus, cadet households were established more
often by wealthy than by poor ie.  That so many bunke were in fact established — they
account for about one-fifth of all household-years in our villages — and that some were
branches of families with only modest landholdings suggests that, in a cultural setting
in which the cadet household was a fully institutionalized possibility, parents found it
difficult to resist the demands of a younger son with whom close emotional bounds had
developed.  This, then, is one reason why prudent parents were eager to limit the
number of sons in their offspring set.
In this family system the gender division of labor was fairly rigid.  Farm
households could not function properly without at least one adult member of each sex,
and they functioned best when there was a balance in the gender of adult workers.
Since this feature looms as an important one in parental strategizing, we provide a brief
ethnographic summary.
It was, of course, virtually universal that child care, food preparation, and the
manufacture and care of clothing were all women’s work.  In addition, women normally
managed the household’s consumption economy and assumed responsibility for
establishing and maintaining relations with kinsmen on both sides (Wakamori 1964:98).
In the cultivation of rice, the principal crop in these villages, men were responsible for
preparing the paddy fields (including plowing, fertilizing, and irrigation) and forDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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carrying the bundles of rice seedlings to the paddy fields, but the critical and meticulous
tasks of transplanting and weeding were women’s work (Kumatani 1970:68; Wakamori
1964:72).  Nightwork was common throughout the year, and here, too, chores were
strictly gender-linked.  In the early fall, men worked at husking rice, women at grinding
flour.  In the late fall and winter, women spun and men made items of straw and fiber:
rope, mats, sacks, sandals, and straw raincoats.  Men continued these activities into the
spring, while women turned to dyeing, weaving, and sewing (Sakurada 1974:223-24;
Andô 1975:215).
Unmarried adolescents in the household performed chores according to gender,
assisting and working with the appropriate parent or grandparent.  Girls began to learn
spinning around age 7 and weaving around age 12, and adult levels of output (e.g.,
spinning ten kin of cotton thread in a three-hour evening) were expected by age 16.
Boys began nightwork and field labor at around age 12 and by late adolescence were
expected to attain adult levels of productivity (e.g., husking one sack of rice in half a
day).  Adolescents formed same-gender cooperative work groups (yui) that performed
the same seasonal tasks in turn for each member’s household (Sakurada 1974:224;
Wakamori 1964:72).  Such groups of unmarried girls were particularly welcomed for
transplanting and weeding paddy fields.  Households that could not afford to hire
servants were reluctant to lose the services of cooperative groups to which their
daughters belonged – doubtless one of the reasons why young women in poor families
married relatively late (Kumatani 1970:289).
One is left with the impression that throughout the agricultural year both men’s
work and women’s work were essential to the household’s well-being, and that
necessary labor inputs in the women’s sphere were at least as great as those in the
men’s sphere.  The household’s need for adult labor of both sexes is apparent from the
haste with which marriage was arranged on the premature death of one parent in a
conjugal family.  In Table 1, which shows data for households with a stem-family
structure after the birth of the first child (grandchild), we see in the upper table that
most male heirs whose mothers were deceased had been married relatively early –
reflecting the urgent need to bring a woman into the household.  The lower table
indicates that, when the erstwhile grandfather was deceased in families whose offspring
included a marriageable daughter but no son (or no grown son), a son-in-law was
quickly brought in for the eldest daughter.  The tables also show that marriage was
delayed when it would “disrupt” the gender balance of a widowed mother and her adult
son or a widowed father and his adult daughter.  (We may also suspect that a widow
would like to keep her son for herself as long as possible, just as a widower might want
to put off the day when a son-on-law would have to be brought in for his daughter.)Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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4. Reproductive strategizing
Our analysis indicates that these villagers were ardent strategizers, using every means
possible to shape the size and configuration of their offspring sets.  The means at their
disposal were contraception, abortion, infanticide and adoption.  We have no way to get
at the incidence or effectiveness of contraceptive efforts, and we have not yet analyzed
patterns of adoption, but we can shed light on abortion and infanticide.  Evidence from
the Tokugawa period is abundant that both infanticide and abortion were commonplace
throughout Japan (Taeuber 1958:21-32; Chiba and Ôtsu 1983; NNS:162-69).  Many of
the reasons given imply objectives that could be achieved by either means, namely, to
terminate illegitimate pregnancies, to space out births in the interests of the mother's
health and the quality of child care, to match offspring-set size to household resources,
and to annul pregnancies of the senior couple in a stem family after the junior couple
have begun childbearing.  Although these various objectives could be achieved by
abortion as well as infanticide, the latter appears to have been favored.  The very term
for infanticide – mabiki, "thinning"– points to its use in spacing out offspring and
limiting their number.  The chief apparent reason for preferring infanticide to abortion
as a means of annulling pregnancies is that it was less harmful to the mother (NSS:171).
A common abortifacient was a mercurial compound that almost certainly had harmful
side effects.  A technique favored by midwives after the mid-seventeenth century was to
insert a stick-like object into the head of the uterus (Hanley and Yamamura 1977:233-
34).  Not only was infanticide less dangerous to the mother, it was also simpler in its
technical requirements and, as Smith (1977:151) has argued, "actually more efficient in
controlling fertility owing to the much longer period of sterility associated with a full-
term pregnancy."
Other objectives of family planners could be met only by infanticide (or by
subsequent adoption out), for they required selection on the basis of observable
characteristics of the live infant(s).  Literature and lore are explicit about twins.  They
were an unnatural abomination and one of them had to be killed.  The sources agree that
the choice was made in terms of sex preference, or if same sex, the relative health the
infants (Kuzutani 1977:227; NSS:161).  Weak, sickly, and deformed infants appear to
have been routinely killed (Muraoka 1972:227; NSS:160).  Selection according to sex
was, of course, possible only through infanticide.  A major advantage of infanticide vis-
à-vis abortion, then, was that it could be used to shape the sex configuration of the
offspring set as well as its size and spacing (Note 5).
Family system norms lead us to expect that two salient goals of reproductive
strategizing in these villages would be gender balance and gender alternation.  Table 2,
which summarizes data for the two villages combined, documents pervasive
intervention to shape offspring sets to these ends.  The top panel contrasts sex ratios ofDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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registered births when existing offspring (two or more) are all girls as against all boys.
The number of missing boys is about the same as the number of missing girls.  In the
middle panel, I have grouped cases where most but not all existing offspring are of one
sex and the youngest previous surviving child is of the same sex; in this situation, then,
parents whose next registered birth is of the opposite sex are achieving both sex
alternation and improved balance.  Here the sex ratios are still more extreme, but we
also see a bit of male bias: interventions to end a string of two or more girls are more
frequent than interventions to end a string of two or more boys.
Table 1: Age at marriage of the heir, by type of stem family and by configuration
of the grandparental generation.* Pooled data for two Nôbi villages,
1717-1869.
All virilocally formed stem households
Husband’s age at marriage
-26 27-29 30+
No. % No. % No. %
Father’s Father only 24 65 7 19   6 16  37
Both Grandparents 37 49 19 24 23 29  79
Father’s Mother only 32 39 22 27 28 34  82
93 48 57 198
All uxorilocally formed stem households
Wife’s age at marriage
- 18 19+
No. %
Mother’s Father only 1 5 83 6
Both Grandparents 6 5 45 11
Mother’s Mother only 8 5 38 13
15 15 30
Note:
*Grandparental configuration at the time of the heir’s first birth.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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Of particular interest are the cases where the two objectives are countervailing.
The bottom panel contrasts families with male-heavy offspring sets where the youngest
child is female with families whose existing offspring are mostly female but with a
male youngest child.  It would appear that, when the objectives of gender balance and
gender alternation conflict, parents are likely to accept what they are given, and in any
case that parents who go for balance are roughly matched in number by those who go
for alternation.  The apparent (though statistically insignificant) sex ratio difference in
the mirror-image categories of births might be interpreted as a soupçon of strategic pro-
male bias.  When existing offspring are female-heavy a few parents appear to pursue
alternation (a son), but when existing offspring are male-heavy parents find a boy or a
girl equally acceptable.  Still, overall, the male bias is strikingly weak.  Despite the
ostensible rule of male primogeniture, then, we see that in these villages male
infanticide is used almost as frequently as female infanticide to approximate gender
balance and alternation.
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this research is that a sizable proportion of
all couples, between one-quarter and one-third, had recourse to infanticide at first birth.
The very possibility that a first-born child might be "returned," as the euphemism had it,
has seemed remote to analysts of Tokugawa demographic history.  A sourcebook on
Japanese folk customs (NSS:162) tells us that in the Kantô region "parents considered
three children as the limit, and the midwife took care of the rest at the time of birth."  In
her classic study of Japanese population Irene Taeuber (1958:31) concludes: "All the
observations of the late Tokugawa and the early Meiji eras indicate that the eldest son
was subject to no hazard of willed death; that furthermore, the first two or three children
were relatively secure."  Thus, it has seemed probable that infanticide and abortion were
being used, as contraception so often is in the modern Western world, only to stop
childbearing after the couple's size objectives had been attained.  Overall sex ratios of
first births in most Japanese populations offer no clue that sex-selective infanticide
might have been practiced.  In our combined sample of two villages, for instance, the
percent male at first birth is 51.8 (a sex ratio of 107), well within the normal range for
human populations.  Thomas C. Smith (1977:65) concluded that "there seems to have
been no general sex preference for the first two births."
My analysis suggests otherwise.  Sex ratios of first registered children appear
normal for the simple reason that couples who killed female infants were roughly
balanced in number by other couples who killed male infants.  The important question
of which couples did which is addressed below.  But first, we must ask why, in a
population where male primogeniture was customary, would couples deliberately kill
first-born males?Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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Table 2: Sex of the next registered birth by gender composition of existing
offspring. Summary data for two Nôbi villages 1717-1869.
1: When existing offspring (2 or more) are all girls as against all boys:
Next registered birth
Existing offspring M F Sex ratio
2 or more girls 114  77 148
2 or more boys 106 134  79
2: When most but not all of the existing offspring are of one sex and the
youngest previous surviving child is of the same sex:
Next registered birth
Existing offspring M F Sex ratio
Mostly F, Youngest F 97 46 211
Mostly M, Youngest M 51 76  67
3: When most but not all of the existing offspring are of one sex and the
youngest previous surviving child is of the opposite sex:
Next registered birth
Existing offspring M F Sex ratio
Mostly M, Youngest F 38 39 97
Mostly F, Youngest M 34 42 81
Ethnographic data point to a culturally preferred daughter-first strategy that was
generally pursued when circumstances minimized its inherent risks.  This strategy is
sanctioned by a saying that had (and still has) nearly universal currency in Japanese
society: ichihime nitarô – "first a girl, then a boy" (e.g., Ôto 1950:191; OSS:126,143).
What lies behind this well-known bit of folk wisdom?  The first consideration has to do
with child care.  We have seen that in the prevailing gender division of labor child care
fell squarely within the domestic sphere, the responsibility of females.  Thus, whereas
fathers and sons were basically out of the picture, daughters were cast in the role of
little mothers.  If the firstborn were a girl, the mother could count on some help inDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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rearing the second and subsequent children, but such help would be postponed several
years if the firstborn were male.  There is the additional consideration that with their
first child mothers lack experience and assurance; if the chances of botching the job are
greater with the firstborn, better it should be a girl than a boy.  Since we are dealing
with a system in which the putative single heir is the eldest son, providing him with an
older sister may be seen as improving his "quality" on two counts: not only a less
harried mother, assured of help in child care, but also a more experienced mother.
Folkloristic explanations for the preferred initial female-male sequence emphasize
dire consequences for the father should the sequence be reversed.  If the firstborn is a
boy, the infant and his father were said to be in competition such that one or the other
would sicken and die early (Ôto 1950:191; NSS:143).  This formulation can only be a
metaphor for the intergenerational conflict – between father as household head and
eldest son as heir presumptive – that is inherent in stem-family systems with male
primogeniture (Cornell 1983).  In the ideal domestic cycle, the son and heir should be
ready to take over management of the farm and begin childbearing at about the time his
father is ready to cease heavy farm labor and acquiesce in the transfer of authority.
Clearly, with a normative retirement age of 60 sai (i.e., a Western age of 59), a son born
when his father was still in his twenties might be expected to challenge his father's
authority prematurely.  If the female-male sequence were pursued via infanticide, the
age of the father at the heir's birth would be increased on average not only by the
spacing between two normal births, but also by the time lost through killing unwanted
male firstborns and unwanted female secondborns.  Fathers who married young would
thus favor girls as firstborns in the interests of unchallenged authority in middle age.
Before proceeding, let me introduce a set of findings from a comparable study
elsewhere in Japan that lends support to my interpretation of ichihime nitarô.  In the
wake of a conference in Japan at which I presented my Nôbi data, two Japanese
historical demographers, Noriko Tsuya and Satomi Kurosu, were moved to look at sex
ratio of births controlled by the configuration of existing offspring.  Their findings,
based on pooled data for roughly the same span of time but for a pair of villages in
northeastern Japan, are shown in Table 3.   The sex ratio of all first births recorded in
the household registers over a period of 150 years is 90.7, this without any analytical
controls on the domestic cycle.  And we may note that many couples who ended up
with a daughter first then strategized for a son second (sex ratio 124.9).  Indeed,
coupled with the high rate of uxorilocal marriage in these villages, these data suggest
that some young fathers might even prefer bringing in a son-in-law of their own
choosing over a son who would offer a premature challenge to his father’s authority.
We may conclude that the daughter-first strategy was generally pursued insofar as
the risk could be minimized that among subsequent births no son would survive.  Our
data generally support the specific hypotheses that may be derived from thisDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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proposition.  (1) The daughter-first strategy was more likely to be followed when the
wife married early, for the risk involved was minimized by the long prospective period
of childbearing.  Conversely, when the wife married exceptionally late, in her early
thirties, say, the couple might be prepared to kill a daughter in order to hasten the
arrival of a son.  (2)  The daughter-first strategy was more likely to be followed by the
rich than by the poor, in part because couples strategized to match offspring-set size to
resources (so that couples in rich households planned to, and did, have relatively large
offspring sets, thereby minimizing the risk of missing out on a male heir) and in part
because the consequences of sonlessness were less than drastic for households with the
resources to attract a high-quality son-in-law. (3) The daughter-first strategy was
favored by men who married young, presumably in order to postpone the birth of the
first son and thereby avoid a premature challenge to paternal authority.  Conversely,
men who married exceptionally late, in their late thirties, say, would likely desire a son
as soon as possible both to ensure an heir and to relieve themselves of heavy farm work
before old age overtook them.
Table 3: Sex ratio of registered births by configuration of existing offspring.














12 + 1 2 6 . 7
03 + —
Source: Tsuya and Kurosu, 1999.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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These considerations suggest that households opt for a female firstborn when
childbearing begins relatively early in the life cycle and the odds are good that the
process of offspring-set formation will not be cut short.  And, in empirical fact, the
completed offspring sets of those whose registered firstborn is female are significantly
larger than those whose registered firstborn is male.  In addition, our analysis shows
that those who end up with a female “firstborn” are far more likely than those who
begin with a son to pursue the additional family-planning objectives of every-other
alternation of the sexes and overall gender balance.  In short it appears that certain
households sought to approximate an offspring set that was headed by a daughter,
characterized by regular alternation of the sexes, and numbered between 5 and 6
altogether.  At the other extreme, households opting for a male firstborn were less
concerned with overall gender balance and ended up with significantly smaller
offspring sets.  The first appears as an optimizing strategy, designed to ensure a high-
quality heir, promote the efficient functioning of the household, and enhance the future
prosperity of the ie; the second appears as a survival strategy, designed to avoid the ie's
extinction.  The first strategy takes risks in the interests of a better future; the second
avoids risk to ensure that there is a future.
If we ask how these reproductive strategies map onto the grid of household
structures, it is not difficult to deduce a set of principled predictions.  The cultural
expectation, of course, was that the heir's marriage would be arranged by his parents
when they are still vigorous, so that childbearing would begin in the context of an intact
stem family headed by the groom's father.  Any departure from this most auspicious
circumstance suggested a degree of demographic or social impairment.  A widow or
widower was at some disadvantage in seeking a daughter-in-law for the heir-designate,
while an orphaned young man was at a distinct disadvantage on the marriage market.
Thus the quality of brides presumably varied across family types.  Since husbands on
average were eight years older than their wives and women were somewhat longer lived
than men in any case, the expected and most common form of the domestic cycle was
that which proceeded from intact stem to GM-only stem to conjugal (as depicted in
Figure 1), and the mean ages of the bride in these three household types, progressing
from 19.5 to 20.4 to 22.2, suggesting that intact couples took their pick of young girls
as they came on the marriage market, leaving the dregs for the orphaned men who
would form conjugal families on marriage.
A not unrelated contingency is the association between household structure and
landholdings at the time of the couple's first registered birth.  From Table 4 (which
excludes the rather anomalous bunke stem households as well as all uxorilocal cases) it
can be seen that better-off households were likely to be in the stem phase of the
domestic cycle at the onset of the couple's childbearing, whereas poor households were
more likely to be in the conjugal phase.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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An early devolution of headship from grandfather to father may also flag difficult
straits.  In the case of a widow, it was customary for the heir to assume the household
headship on marriage if not before.  But in the case of a widower or an intact senior
couple, the devolution of headship to the heir on marriage typically implied that the
senior man was  infirm or senile.  In fact, the mean age of the senior men in such
households was 71.  Intact stem households headed by the Fa might offer the advantage
of a still-active GM, but GF-only stem households headed by the Fa were, other things
equal, worse off than conjugal families because of the added dependency burden.
Table 4: Household structure by size of household landholding at the time of the





Poor Interm. Rich Total
  No. % No. No. % No. %
Stem:   GF only     4 10 15 16 46 35 100
Stem:   Both GP   24 28 24 38 44 86 100
Stem:   GM only   30 45 16 21 31 67 100
Conjugal:  Bunke   23 48 12 13 27 48 100
Conjugal:  Ord.   28 52 18 8 15 54 100
Total 109 37 85 96 33 290
Note:
* The poor category is dominated by landless households, but also includes those with less than 0.5 koku of land – which would have
been devoted largely to the homestead and a garden plot; most were tenants. Intermediate refers to households with holdings of
0.5 to 12.9 koku, and rich to households with 13.0 koku and more.
Finally, it should be made clear that bunke (cadet or branch) households were in a less
precarious position than their structural counterparts in ongoing honke  households.
Most of the cadet or branch households were established by the brothers of heirs,
typically, of course, younger brothers, with the approval of the main household (honke).
Thus, a couple married at the establishment of a conjugal bunke could fall back on their
honke in bad times, a possibility not open to an ordinary conjugal household.  As for
bunke stem families, it turns out to have been customary in the Nôbi region for theDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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mother of the younger son who established a bunke to move in with him and his bride.
The  bunke head assumed responsibility for health care, funeral arrangements and
ancestral rites, and the mother's tablet became the focus of ancestor worship for the new
ie (Takeda 1964: 426).  Thus, unlike the ordinary GM-only stem family, a bunke GM-
only stem family would not imply the prior death of the GF, and the honke headed by
that GF would be expected to provide assistance as needed to the family in which his
wife now lived.
These details must suffice by way of justification for the ordering, shown in Table
5, of all occurring varieties of virilocal households along the range from a
favorable/auspicious structural situation to one that is vulnerable/precarious.  For
purposes of presenting statistical data, the categories with fewer than 15 cases have
been grouped with neighbors along the conceptual continuum to yield five classes
shown in Table 6.
Table 5: Virilocal households classified according to structural position from






GF Both Ordinary 74 1
GF GF only Ordinary 28 2
GM GM only Ordinary 3
Fa GM only Bunke 12 3
Fa GM only Ordinary 65
Fa Both Ordinary 13
Fa Neither Bunke 55
4
Fa Neither Ordinary 54
Fa GF only Bunke 1 5
Fa GF only Ordinary 8
Total 313Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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Table 6:  Mean duration from marriage to last birth, Pct. male of first registered
births, Mean no. of female births per couple, and Mean no. of all

















1  Both GPa, GF head 16.1 38.9 2.71 5.44 74
2  GF only, GF head 15.2 46.2 2.66 4.83 28
3  GM only 15.2 53.5 2.17 4.44 80
4  Bunke conjugal &
     Both GPa, Fa head
13.8 59.7 1.86 4.10 68
5  Ord. conjugal &
     GF only, Fa head
12.3 60.3 1.56 3.73 63
The focus of Table 6 is on the reproductive behavior of couples situated in
households of the specified structures at the onset of childbearing.  The first column
shows the mean duration of marriage at the time of the last registered birth, that is, the
number of years that elapsed from marriage to the end of childbearing.  This variable
may be interpreted as the degree of reproductive play enjoyed by couples beginning
their childbearing in different household structures.  The progression from a high of
16.1 years to a low of 12.3 years provides a rough validation of our ordering of
household structures along the dimension from auspicious to precarious.  The
remaining columns provide evidence that the incidence of couples pursuing the
daughter-first strategy declines as predicted along the same dimension.  The proportion
male of first registered births increases from under 39 percent in the most favorable of
the household structures to over 60 percent in the most vulnerable.  The average
number of daughters registered per couple declines steadily from 2.71 to 1.56.  And
mean completed fertility declines along the same continuum of household structures
from 5.44 to 3.73.
In short, what my analysis shows is that when the heir couple begin childbearing in
the intact stem phase of the cycle, with both grandparents present, they tend to follow
the optimizing daughter-first strategy, but when the couple begin childbearing in the
conjugal phase, i.e., after the death of both grandparents, they are more likely to follow
the survival son-first strategy.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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To rephrase, during the stem phase of the domestic cycle, when the grandfather is
family head, the junior couple hews more closely to the cultural norms: daughter first,
gender balance and every-other-alternation.  Is this simply a function of rational
calculation on the part of the parents, who size up the objective situation of the stem
family and extrapolate its prospects accordingly, or is it because grandparents, and in
particular the senior family head, directly influence reproductive decisions?  I have no
data that bear directly on this question.  However, one suspects that so long as the
headship remains in the senior generation, grandparents would have made their views
known; in some cases, no doubt, their advice was decisive.
5. An Indirect Role for Grandfathers?
I am on firmer ground in pointing to an indirect role of grandparents on reproductive
strategizing via the decision they make with respect to the heir’s marriage.  The age at
which the heir marries is critical, and this is determined by the senior couple so long as
they retain the headship; and even when the headship has devolved on the heir,
arrangements for his marriage may still be made by the parents.  We have already seen
clear evidence (Table 1) of family strategizing with respect to marriage of the heir (or
heiress) when the need for gender balance of adults motivates early marriage in some
situations and delayed marriage in others.  In this regard let me introduce an intriguing
intergenerational pattern (first called to my attention by Thomas C. Smith).  If in one
generation the father married late, then his son would usually be married at an early
age; his son in turn, having been born when his father was young, would not be married
until a relatively late age, and so on – yielding an alternating shift in nuptiality between
the generations.  It will be seen in Table 7 that father’s age at marriage is indeed
inversely related to the age difference between him and his father.  We might ponder
the differential experience of fathers who fall in the various cells of the table.  Young
fathers in the upper-right cells would have slipped easily into their succession, whereas
those in the upper-left cells would have wrested authority prematurely and demanded an
early marriage from their fathers.  My argument is that while all young fathers might be
motivated to avoid an early-born son, those whose own fathers were young would be
even more so in order to prevent their heirs doing to them what they had done to their
own fathers.  A similar logic operated for the fathers who married late: All would likely
desire a son early in the marriage to ensure an heir and to relieve themselves of heavy
farmwork before old age overtook them, but the personal experience of those at lower
right was likely to have intensified the desire to have a male firstborn.  For in these
cases the very continuity of the ie would have been endangered by the father’s failure toDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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Table 7: Father's age at marriage by age difference between father and his father.
Ordinary virilocal stem families with GF present at the time of the first
registered birth.
Father's age at marriage Total




Fa and FaFa No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct.
     - 29 2 10 8 40 10 50 20 100
30 - 39 8 13 38 60 17 27 63 100
40 - 45 5 20 12 48 8 32 25 100
46 + 7 41 8 47 2 12 17 100
Total 226 6 3 7 1 2 5
have his son early enough and his inability to provide a daughter-in-law in good time.
Men with such a background might well be strongly motivated to have a son as soon as
possible.
Table 8 shows, as we might expect from the argument in the preceding section,
that father’s age at marriage is not unrelated to his subsequent choice of reproductive
strategy.  So we are led to posit that a man’s decision as to when to marry his son and
heir indirectly shapes the reproductive strategizing of the heir.  The data in Figure 2
lend substance to this idea. In the upper panel, men whose fathers were relatively young
and who married at a relatively young age were prone to kill a male firstborn
(registered births 64% F), whereas men whose fathers were relatively old and who
themselves married late were prone to kill a female firstborn (registered births 82% M).
In these families, where the senior man was still alive at the onset of his son’s
childbearing, it would have been the grandparents’ decision as to when the son would
marry.  Interestingly enough, the pattern is replicated for virilocally formed conjugal
families (meaning that the grandparents had died before childbearing of the junior
couple was under way), as shown in the lower panel.  The younger “grandfathers” were
most likely still in charge and making decisions at the time of their sons’ marriage.
Even though many of the older “grandfathers-to-be” had already died before the
marriage of the heir, their decision not to marry him earlier would still be relevant.
Thus, “grandfathers”’ decisions regarding their sons’ nuptiality strongly influenced the
reproductive strategizing of the junior couple in their ie.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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Perhaps this intergenerational dialectic could keep going without a lot of conscious
decision-making, but in fact, howsoever predetermined by structural sequences, fathers
made decisions that strongly shaped the reproductive strategies of their heirs, which is
to say, the gender configuration of their grandchildren.
Table 8: Sex of the first registered child by father's age at marriage.
Husband's age
at marriage Male Female Total
% Male of first
registered
births
     - 23 30 37 67 44.8
24 - 27 37 40 77 48.1
28 - 35 74 62 136 54.4
36 - 31 21 52 59.6
Total 172     160 332 51.8Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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A. Ordinary virilocal stemfamilies with GF only, by GF-Fa age difference.
B. Ordinary virilocal conjugal families only, by (deceased) GF-Fa age difference.
Figure 2:  Sex of first registered child by father's age at marriage and the age
difference between the father and his father.
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6. Grandmothers and the Number of Surviving Grandchildren
Quite apart from reproductive strategies, we might ask if the presence of grandparents
affects the number of the junior couple’s offspring. In our villages at least, the answer is
a dubious maybe for grandfathers but yes for grandmothers.  Table 9 presents relevant
findings for four classes of couples specified according to household structure at the
time of their first registered birth: those in 1) conjugal families, 2) GF-only stem
families, 3) intact and GM-only stem families where the senior woman is 60 years or
older at the time of first registered birth, and 4) intact and GM-only stem families where
the senior woman is under 60 years of age.  (The mean age of grandmothers in the third
category is 67.2 years as against 50.9 years for those in the fourth category.)  The data
shown in Table 9 are limited to couples formed in the standard fashion, that is, by
bringing in a daughter-in-law for the male heir of an ongoing ie.  It will be seen in the
first column that the total fertility rate (net infant mortality) is lowest for couples in
conjugal households, somewhat higher for couples in truncated stem households
lacking a grandmother, higher still for couples in stem households with grandmothers
who were already quite old at the time of the first birth, and highest of all for couples in
stem households with grandmothers who were relatively young at the onset of
childbearing.  This regular progression is upheld when the data are controlled by the
households' landholdings (not shown).  When the total marital fertility rate (net infant
mortality) is decomposed into age-specific rates (Figure 3), we see that for a
dichotomized sample the association between fewer grandchildren and the absence of a
grandmother holds throughout the childbearing span.
Table 9:  Total marital fertility net infant mortality and mean intervals between
registered births, by household structure and GM’s age.





GF-only stem 6.24 3.27
Other stem, GM 60+ 6.56 3.26
Other stem, GM -59 7.38 2.64
Notes:
* At-risk years are specified as those when the woman is living with her husband in the same household.
^ The average length of intervals over the entire series of registered offspring, including that from marriage to the first registered
child.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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Figure 3:  Age-specific marital fertility rates (net infant mortality), by the presence
or absence of the grandmother.
The details of these findings point to child care as the major motivating factor in
the differential number of offspring in families with and without grandmothers.  The
burden of child care, which falls heavily on parents in a conjugal family, can be shared
with grandparents in a stem family.  Since child care in Tokugawa society fell squarely
on the female side of a rather rigid gender division of labor, we are really talking about
mothers and their mothers-in-law.  In the absence of the senior woman at the onset of
childbearing, a young couple might well be more strongly motivated to space out births
and possibly limit their number.  Such motivation would, however, be muted in the case
of stem households in which the senior woman was relatively young at the time of the
couple's first birth.
Of course we must recognize that a woman's childbearing may not be limited to a
single phase of the domestic cycle.  In fact, a couple whose household is already in the
conjugal phase at the onset of childbearing would normally experience all their
childbearing in the conjugal phase, that is, prior to the heir's marriage, which ushers in
the stem phase.  In the Japanese case, it was considered both shameful and dangerous
for the senior couple to continue procreation after the marriage of the heir, and in fact
no such births are revealed in the registers for the villages under analysis.  However,
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those who begin childbearing in stem households may well experience the transition to
the conjugal phase before the completion of their childbearing.  In this regard, the
results of the control on mother’s age support the hypothesis that the primary
motivation here is child care.
As already mentioned, it is intuitively obvious that mothers in households lacking
a senior woman would be motivated to space out births so as to lighten their child-care
burden, and, indeed, in the final column of Table 9, we see that spacing behavior is
almost certainly the major mechanism behind the differential rates shown in column 1.
In conjugal households the intervals between registered births were abnormally long,
3.55 years on average, declining steadily in the predicted order to 2.64 years in stem
households with young grandmothers.  One could say that in the absence of
grandmotherly assistance, couples took steps to space out their offspring.  Another take
would suggest a more pro-active role for grandmothers, in keeping with their proverbial
role as “conservators of tradition.”  As we have seen, when grandmothers are present,
whether in intact stem families or GM-only stem families, reproductive strategies
appear to favor gender balance, gender alternation, and larger surviving offspring sets.
It is possible that grandmothers, more committed to traditional family system norms,
urged the younger couple to risk more pregnancies in hopes of a closer approximation
to the cultural ideal.
7. Nuptial Configuration and Conjugal Power
This section sets the stage for an effort to ascertain in what circumstances grandmothers
may play a direct role in reproductive decision-making.  To do so we must look at the
relative power of adults within the family, and critical in this regard is conjugal power,
the relative power of husband and wife within the conjugal unit.  In an earlier treatment
of this topic (Skinner 1993), based on historical ethnographic data as well as analyses of
household registers, I concluded that in Edo-period village families, the conjugal
relationship was relatively egalitarian:
To sum up, within the ie, women controlled the domestic sphere of activity,
which was essential to the household’s production as well as its reproduction
and continuity.  In the later phases of the life cycle, husbands were more likely
to be dependent on their wives than the other way around.  Moreover, wives no
less than husbands enjoyed de facto sexual autonomy, and their alternatives
outside a particular marriage were very nearly as good as their husbands’.  For
these and other reasons, the bargaining power of women within marriage
should have been considerable and their domestic power potentially on a parDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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with that of their husbands.  It is less certain whether the forms and rhetoric of
male dominance that also characterized village society should be seen as
tipping the balance of conjugal power in favor of men or as providing a
culturally acceptable framework whereby the wife realized her power potential
by allowing her husband to be the overt decision-maker. (p.347)
The most important structural determinant of conjugal power is the relative age of
the spouses at marriage.  A pattern whereby husbands are normally older by a sizeable
margin is, of course, congruent with patriarchal authority, and (as Japanese informants
are quick to point out) brides are more readily socialized to the ways of the household
when they are young. The distribution of marriage ages in our two villages is instructive
in this regard. In general men married at considerably older ages than women, and the
variance in marriage age was far greater for men than for women. Both patterns are
characteristic of Japan as a whole (Hayami 1987) and of virtually all of the developing
counties covered by the World Fertility Survey (Casterline, Williams, and McDonald
1986) (Note 6). The mean ages at marriage, 20.6 for women and 28.4 for men, indicate
that on average husbands were seven to eight years older than their wives. In less than 6
percent of the couples were women as old or older than their husbands, whereas in over
a third of all couples men were at least ten years older than their wives.
Nuptiality can be viewed as a customary norm in any society; it can be shown, in
fact, that cultural preferences operate not only with respect to the ages at which men
and women ought to marry but also to the acceptability of certain age differences
(Casterline, Williams, and McDonald 1986). However, the variation of concern here is
not among societies but rather among couples within the same society. The factors
influencing marriage age are many and varied, with specifically cultural norms playing
only a part, but whatever the complex of causes that determine the marriage ages of the
couple, the effect of the marriage-age configuration is systemic. I would argue, in fact,
that the configuration of spousal ages is such a strong and systemic determinant of
conjugal power that the former can be taken, within limits, as an index of the latter. The
rationale for such an index is worth spelling out in detail.
Conjugal power is likely to vary systematically according to both the wife’s
absolute age at marriage and the age difference between her and her husband. A 16-
year-old girl is, almost by definition, shy, self-effacing, and inexperienced by
comparison with a 26-year-old woman (Note 7).
 In the context of a Tokugawa village,
moreover, a 16-year-old will have had few occasions to leave her natal village, whereas
any woman marrying as late as 26 is likely to have worked for a time outside the village
as a servant or weaver or waitress. Holding the absolute age difference between the
spouses constant (at six years, say, so that the 16-year-old marries a man of 22 and theDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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26-year-old marries a man of 32), it is clear that the former is more likely than the latter
to be dominated by her husband in the early years of marriage.
At the same time, varying the age difference between the spouses also has an
independent effect. If each of our two brides confronts a groom of 26 (so the 16-year-
old marries a man ten years her senior and the 26-year-old marries a man of the same
age), then the contrast between the couples would be sharpened, for the authority of the
husband would be further enhanced in the eyes of the younger bride but considerably
diminished in the eyes of the older bride. Thus, in couples formed through the marriage
of absolutely young women to men relatively much older, the husband is likely to
overpower his wife. But in couples formed through the marriage of absolutely older
women to men of roughly the same age, the wife is likely to stand up for her own
interests and defend her preferences.
A reference to Figure 4 will situate this argument and point us toward the
weighting to be used in constructing an index. The marriage-age matrix shows wife’s
age at marriage in rows and husband’s age at marriage in columns. The first component
of the proposed index, the absolute age of wife at marriage (WAGEMAR), is displayed
at the top. The second component, the age difference between the spouses (DIFAGE), is
displayed at the bottom. These dimensions represent only two of the many possible
ways of slicing the marriage-age matrix. The various cuts that might be made
intermediate between DIFAGE and WAGEMAR would represent different weightings
of the two components, and two of these are diagramed in Figure 4. With DIFAGE
specified as H-W (husband’s age minus wife’s age), the dimension H-2W will be seen
as exactly halfway between DIFAGE and WAGEMAR, and, indeed, H-2W gives equal
weight to the two components. The dimension formalized as H-3W gives greater weight
to the wife’s age at marriage (WAGEMAR) then to spousal age difference (DIFAGE).
I have used both of these indexes in my initial analyses, and it is clear that the empirical
data “favor” the latter (Note 8). That is, the statistical associations between conjugal
power and reproductive (and other) behaviors are higher when conjugal power is
indexed by H-3W, which I call HUSPOWER rather than, say, CONPOWER, so that its
directionality will be clear: high values indicate that the husband is likely to be
dominant, low values that the wife is likely to be dominant (Figure 4).
It is probably correct to say, echoing an earlier formulation, that in couples high on
the HUSPOWER index the husband’s domination in practice conforms fully to the
patriarchal rhetoric, whereas in couples intermediate on the index the wife would carry
her weight without arousing her husband’s anxiety about his authority. In couples still
lower on the HUSPOWER index, we might expect the actual power of the wives to
match or even exceed that of their husbands despite the public façade of male
dominance. In this range of the index Rogers’ notion of a “probably unconscious”Husband’s age at marriage 
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Figure 4:  Dimensions of the marriage age matrix: HUSPOWER in relation to
  WAGEMAR and DIFAGE.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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exchange between power and image would be particularly apt: “I’ll give you credit for
making decisions here, if you’ll make the ones I tell you to” (Rogers 1975:747).
Couples in which husbands are not allowed even the façade of authority would,
presumably, fall at the low extreme of the HUSPOWER index.
A number of contingencies compound the significance of the HUSPOWER
dimension.  On the demographic side, for instance, women with husbands much older
than themselves are more likely to be widowed, and to be widowed at an early age, than
are women married to men of nearly the same age.  On the side of social dynamics,
spouses close together in age are more likely to be solidary vis-á-vis other members of
the household than are those separated by many years.  On the psychological side, since
mothers tend to encourage the emotional dependence of eldest sons in particular, we
may expect men who marry late to have been closely bound emotionally to their
mothers, whereas men who marry young may have signified their independence of their
mothers by insisting on an early marriage.  While these are strictly speaking
concomitants of DIFAGE, they cannot be overlooked in explaining variation along the
closely related HUSPOWER dimension of the marriage-age matrix.
8. Grandmothers in Coalition
We are now positioned to understand how conjugal power affects the decision to keep
or return a newborn child – the critical reproductive decision in village families.  I essay
here a comparative analysis of couples in two different phases of the domestic cycle at
the onset of childbearing and focus on registered first births.  To bring out the role of
grandmothers, I contrast GM-only stem families with virilocal conjugal families.  The
only difference in household composition between the two family types, then, is the
presence of the widowed grandmother.  Figure 5 displays data on the sex of first
registered births in the marriage-age matrix for couples in conjugal families (the charts
to the left) and for those in GM-only stem families (the charts to the right).  Both
categories are limited to cases where the marriage form was virilocal; thus, the
grandmother is always the father’s mother.  Because women’s nuptiality is inversely
related to her family’s SES, we control on landholdings.  The data shown in Figure 5
are summarized in Table 10, and the implied findings with respect to infanticide at first
birth are schematized in Table 11.  Focusing first on virilocal conjugal families (the
left-hand charts), we see that high-HUSPOWER couples apparently practice female
infanticide when needed to get a male “firstborn,” whereas low-HUSPOWER couples
apparently practice male infanticide when needed to get a female “firstborn.”  This
inference from the unnatural sex ratios, summarized in Table 10, is supported by an
analysis of preceding intervals (not shown here).Intermediate (0.5-12.9 koku)
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Figure 5: Sex of first registered birth by HUSPOWER, controlling landholdings
 and comparing two household types: virilocal conjugal vs. grandmother-
 only stem.
Richer (5.0 koku or more) Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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Table 10:   Summary of the data presented in Figure 5
VIRILOCAL CONJUGAL GM-ONLY STEM
Sex of first registered child Sex of first registered child
HUSPOWER M       F            T %M HUSPOWER M       F         T %M
Low 11 21 32 34 Low 17 3 20 85
Intermediate 16 14 30 53 Intermediate 12 11 23 52
High 27 5 32 84 High 4 11 15 27
Total 54 40 94 Total 33 25 58
Table 11:   Schematic summary of inferred infanticide at first birth
HUSPOWER Conjugal families GM-only stem families
Low (Wi dominant) M infanticide F infanticide
Intermediate Little / none Little / none
High (Hu dominant) F infanticide M infanticide
The presumed dynamic within conjugal families is straightforward.  With only two
“players,” there is no scope for coalition formation, and the results can be interpreted as
a simple outcome of the respective desires and power of husband and wife.  Husbands
prefer a son, and they prevail when HUSPOWER is high; wives prefer a daughter, and
they prevail when HUSPOWER is low; when neither prevails, parents apparently
accept what they are given.
Why, in this context, do husbands prefer sons and wives prefer daughters?  First of
all, in the absence of grandparents, the force of the daughter-first logic outlined above is
strengthened for wives but weakened for husbands.  The anxiety of a young bride
concerning her inexperience as a mother would be sharpened by the absence of anyone
with child-care experience.  Her need for help in child care sooner rather than later
could be met only through rearing a daughter.  Hence, for the bride the attractiveness of
the daughter-first strategy is enhanced by her isolation.  At the same time, the husband’s
fear of a precocious challenge from an early-born heir, though still present, would beDemographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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less salient than in stem households since the issue had been experientially muted
through his own father’s early death.  Second, the constraints of the gender division of
labor take on particular salience in a household consisting solely of a conjugal couple.
Just as daughters would eventually lighten mothers’ domestic chores, so sons could
eventually relieve some of their fathers’ back-breaking field work.  Since men were
generally much older than their wives, it would seem only fair that help in their domain
should come first.  By virtue of their greater age, husbands more than wives would be
concerned to ensure a surviving son (and heir) soon and less inclined to run the risk in
this regard of pursuing the female-first strategy.  It is telling that both of these
considerations would weigh more heavily on husbands high in HUSPOWER (that is, on
those who succeeded in forcing female infanticide), for by definition such husbands
were both absolutely old and relatively much older than their wives.
Let us now contrast the findings for virilocally formed conjugal families with those
for virilocally formed stem families in which the grandfather has died. “First-birth” data
for such households, set out on the right side of Figure 5, contrast diametrically with
those for conjugal households: High-HUSPOWER couples, who annul girls to attain
male “firstborns” in conjugal families, annul boys to attain female “firstborns” in
grandmother-only stem families.  Low-HUSPOWER couples practice male infanticide
in conjugal families but female infanticide in grandmother-only stem families. Why?
When three “players” are present, as in the grandmother-only stem family, three
coalitions are theoretically possible, but a coalition between the father’s mother and her
daughter-in-law is improbable given the psychodynamics of the situation in the first few
years of marriage.  My argument is that the conjugal coalition (the husband and wife
contra the husband’s mother) prefers a first-born male, and that it prevails when
HUSPOWER is low, whereas the filial coalition (the mother and the son contra the
daughter-in-law) prefers a first-born female, and that it prevails when HUSPOWER is
high.  Why might coalition formation be expected to vary systematically in this way?
First, spouses are close together in age when HUSPOWER is low but far apart when
HUSPOWER is high, which circumstance favors conjugal solidarity in the former but
not the latter.  Second, in low-HUSPOWER couples the bride is older and more mature
and thus better positioned to stand up to her mother-in-law. Third, since the widowed
mother would have had a major say in the timing of her son’s marriage, high-
HUSPOWER (late-marrying) husbands are likely to have been closely bound
emotionally to their mothers, whereas low-HUSPOWER (early-marrying) husbands
may have been self selected for emotional independence.
The situation in a grandmother-only stem family is different from that in a
conjugal family on two counts. First, the presence of the grandmother to assist in the
domestic sphere and to help rear the heir serves to reduce the mother’s reasons for
desiring a girl. Second, with two adult women but only one adult male in the household,Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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the gap to be filled first should logically be on the male side of the division of labor.
These circumstances resolve the conflicting interests of the spouses that obtain in
conjugal families so that solidary couples in grandmother-only stem families can
readily agree that their best interests would be served by a son. Note that in households
with low-HUSPOWER couples, the grandmother is likely to be relatively young at the
time of marriage (for her son married early), so that the couple could reasonably expect
her to remain active in the domestic sphere until a female secondborn would be old
enough to take on domestic chores.
9. Summary Conclusion
I have shown that in these Nôbi villages, not atypical for central and northern Japan
during the later part (1700-1868) of the Edo period, the particulars of the prevailing
stem family system fostered a culturally favored set of reproductive goals, in particular,
a daughter as eldest child, followed by a son (and heir), coupled with gender alternation
in subsequent reproduction and overall gender balance.  This reproductive strategy,
sanctioned by the mantra ichihime nitarô, was generally followed during the stem phase
of the domestic cycle, when one or both grandparents were present, especially when the
family head was in the senior generation. By contrast, a son-first strategy was favored
when childbearing began in the conjugal phase of the cycle.   This suggests
grandparental influence on the junior couple’s reproductive decisions in favor of the
cultural ideal.  I have argued that the senior couple’s decision to marry the heir early or
late strongly affects the reproductive strategies followed by him after marriage.  I have
demonstrated that when a grandmother is present at the onset of childbearing, especially
if she is fairly young, the junior couple ends up with more offspring.  For the junior
couple, the key factor must be that the grandmother can mitigate the child-care burden
of a larger offspring set; for the grandmother, the larger offspring set may reflect her
efforts to encourage the younger couple to risk more pregnancies in hopes of attaining a
closer approximation of the ideal offspring set.  My final example (of infanticiding
behavior) suggests that such summary generalizations may obscure the actual operative
dynamics of reproductive strategizing. A grandmother gets her way only when she and
her son gang up on the daughter-in-law, but that coalition is likely only when her son
dominates the conjugal relationship, which in turn reflects the grandmother’s success in
binding the son tightly to her emotionally and in delaying his marriage.  Otherwise, the
grandmother may be shut out from reproductive decision-making by the solidary
conjugal coalition.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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Notes
1.   Meyer Fortes (1949, 1958) provided the initial conceptualization of the domestic
cycle. He insisted that the family be analyzed as a process, and observed that the
various family types found in a population at any point in time are normally phases
in a normative developmental cycle.
2.   Also known as nuclear family, elementary family, and simple family.
3.   It goes without saying that in all family types that include CUs in adjacent
generations, one of the spouses in each junior CU will also be a member of the
senior CU (or one of the senior CUs).  This linking or overlapping member is, of
course, normally a son or daughter of the senior couple.
4.   I am indebted to Akira Hayami and Thomas C. Smith for generously providing
access to their datasets.
5.   The methods used to detect infanticide cannot be fully described here.  It should be
emphasized that infanticide can only be inferred from data in the shūmon-aratame-
chō.  Vital events were recorded once a year at a fixed time, so that a child born
and put to death during an elapsed year would never be entered into the record.
Nor is it possible to determine sex-selective infanticide for any particular couple;
whatever the combination of births by sex and interval, it could not be said to fall
outside the expected range of variation.  My strategy, therefore, is to work with
homogeneously defined subsets of registered births.  The assumption is that
couples whose objective circumstances are similar in crucial respects (form of
marriage, nuptial configuration, household structure, and household landholdings)
are likely to follow similar reproductive strategies.  If we then analyze registered
births subset by subset (each defined homogeneously in terms of number and
configuration of preceding siblings and mother’s age at time of birth), evidence of
sex-selective infanticide is revealed. An unnatural sex ratio is, of course, the critical
evidence of sex-selective infanticide, but I accept a skewed sex ratio as reliable
evidence only when the patterning of intervals for those births is compatible with
infanticide of the sex that would have produced the skewing.
6.   It is no less true of Tokugawa Japan than of contemporary developing countries
that “observed distributions of the age difference are not simply the coincidental
by-product of the random matching of separately determined distributions of men’s
and women’s ages at marriage.  Certain age differences are avoided; others chosen
more frequently” (ibid., p. 374). It would appear that demographic determinants of
spousal age difference (age structure constraints on the pool of possible matches)Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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are less important in explaining variation among societies than sociocultural
factors, particularly family system norms and gender ideology.
7.   Writing about the first Japanese village studied by Western anthropologists, Smith
and Wiswell (1982:xviii) observe that in Suye-mura in the 1930s “girls and young
women, especially new brides, exhibited paralyzing degrees of shyness.”
8.   This suggests, of course, that the absolute age of the wife at marriage is more
salient in shaping conjugal power, which in turn implies that the conjugal patterns
established in the initial year or two of marriage have considerable staying power.Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 5
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